The UAW and CAW Confront
Lean Production at Saturn, CAMI, and
the Japanese Automobile Transplants
Ernest J. Yanarella and William C. Green

The North American auto marketplace witnessed a major restructuring
during the 1980s. This article examines UAW's and CAW's quite different
and distinctive responses to these developments at two union plants: the
UAW's and GM's joint operation of the Saturn plant and the CAW's
adversarial shop floor labor-management relations at CAMI, a GM-Suzuki
joint venture. Then the article focuses on the common challenges both
unions have to overcome in organizing Hyundai, the South Korean
automaker, and the six Japanese plants. The article closes by exploring
the risks and opportunities both unions face from the North American
Free Trade Agreement.

During the decade of the eighties, ten East Asian automobile assembly
plants were built across the industrial heartland of North America from
Smyrna, Tennessee to Bromont, Quebec. 1 This experience, rooted in the
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restructuring of the global political economy and the internationalization of
automobile production, brought into sharp focus the crisis of the Fordist
regime of industrial production and capital accumulation. 2 This crisis, which
has radiated through the United States and Canadian auto industries and
through the United Auto Workers (UAW) and the Canadian Auto Workers
(CAW) unions, has exposed the limitations of the mass production system
pioneered by Henry Ford and has threatened the stability of the post-World
War II system of labor-management relations.
The impact of these developments has been a source of mounting and
heated scholarly debate. U.S. and Canadian scholars have observed two
distinctive political strategies employed by the UAW and CAW in response
to the negative consequences of these developments for organized labor in
the U.S. and Canadian auto production and auto supplier industries. 3 Some
have extolled the virtues of an incipient "post-Fordist" regime 4 synthesizing
mass and craft production into lean management and assembly line techniques.5 Others, while acknowledging new tendencies manifested in Japanese production techniques, have developed a theory of neo-Fordism6 that
2. Fordism is a method of mass production characterized by a division of the assembly
line into ever more specific and defined tasks and a division of labor "which was inflexible,
hierarchical, and characterized by increasing automation, routinization, and mechanization of
production tasks." John Holmes, "Industrial Restructuring in a Period of Crisis: An Analysis
of the Canadian Automobile Industry, 1973-1983," Antipode. 20 (1988), 19-51.
3. Gregory Albo, "The 'New Realism' and Canadian Workers," Canadian Politics, ed.
A. Gagner and J. Breckerton (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadmire, 1990), 47-53; and Jonathan
Morris, "A Japanization of Canadian Industry?" The New Era of Global Competition, ed. by
Daniel Drache and Meric S. Gertler (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), 206228.
4. Post-Fordism or lean production is a flexible production system characterized by the
integration and rationalization of assembly and auto parts production and the reliance on the
team concept to provide so-called multiskilled training, job rotation, continuous work improvement, and reduced product defects. For a discussion of post-Fordism, see the references
in footnote 5.
5. Haruo Shimada and John Paul McDuffie. "Industrial Relations and 'Humanware':
Japanese Investments in Automobile Manufacturing in the United States." {IMVP briefing
paper] (Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, International Motor Vehicle Program,
May 4, 1987); Martin Kenney and Richard Florida. "Beyond Mass Production: Production and
the Labor Process in Japan," Politics and Society, 16 (March 1988), 121-158; James Womack,
Daniel Jones, and Daniel Roos, The Machine that Changed the World (New York: Rawson
and Associates, 1990); Richard Florida and Martin Kenney, "Transplanted Organizations: The
Transfer of Japanese Industrial Organization to the U.S.," American Sociological Review, 56
(June 1991), 381-398; and Martin Kenney and Richard Florida, Beyond Mass Production:
The Japanese System and its Transfer to the United States (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993).
6. Neo-Fordism views lean production as a theoretical alternative which in practice
produces an intensified or hyper-Fordist regime of production and accumulation.
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highlights the deeper continuities between mass production and lean production.7 Still others have pointed to more synthetic models of production and
consumption that incorporate the best Fordist and "post-Fordist" elements in
a new regime that acknowledges the shortcomings of Fordist mass production, but preserves a critical role for organized labor. 8
Against the background of this scholarly debate and the crisis of
Fordism, the first and second sections of this article will examine the restructuring of the North American auto industry and UAW's and CAW's quite
different and distinctive responses to these developments. The third section
will explore the UAW-General Motor's collective response to the transplant
phenomenon: their agreement to locate the Saturn auto plant in Tennessee,
recruit UAW -represented workers, and jointly operate a lean production
facility. Then this section will turn to the UAW local's response to the
challenges that jointness has posed in the union's representation of its
members. The fourth section will examine the active involvement of the
CAW in the recruitment of CAMI (the General Motors-Suzuki joint venture), the collective agreement it struck with Suzuki to represent the workers,
and the dilemmas the union leadership has faced in organizing and representing workers. The next section will focus on the common challenges both
unions have yet to overcome in organizing the other East Asian automobile
facilities: Honda, Hyundai, Nissan, Subaru-Isuzu, and Toyota. Finally, the
7. Knuth Dohse, Ulrich Jurgens, and Thomas Maish, "From 'Fordism' to 'Toyotism'?
The Social Organization of the Labor Process in the Japanese Automobile Industry," Politics
and Society, 14 (1985), 115-146; Stephen Meyer, "The Persistence of Fordism: Workers and
Technology in the American Automobile Industry 190{}-1960," On the Line: Essays in the
History of Auto Work, , ed. by Nelson Lichenstein and Stephen Meyer (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1989), 73-95; Jane Jenson, '"Different' but not 'Exceptional': Canada's Permeable Fordism,'' Canadian Journal of Sociology and Anthropology, 26 (1989), 69-94; and John
Bellamy Foster and Charles Woolfson, "Corporate Restructuring and Business Unionism: The
Lessons of Caterpillar and Ford,'' New Left Review, 147 (March/April 1989), 51--66.
8. Wolfgang Streeck, "Introduction: Industrial Relations, Technological Change and
Economic Restructuring,'' Wolfgang Streeck, ed. Industrial Relations and Technological Change
in the British, Italian and German Automobile Industry (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum, 1985);
Rianne Mahon, "From Fordism to?: New Technology, Labour Markets and Unions," Economic
and Industrial Democracy, 8 (1987), 5--60; Lowell Turner, Democracy at Work: Changing
World Labor Markets and the Future of Labor Unions (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991);
Barry Bluestone and Irving Bluestone, Negotiating the Future: A Labor Perspective on American
Business (New York: Basic Books, 1992); Alain Lipietz. Towards a New Economic Order:
Postfordism, Ecology, and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Richard
Edwards, Rights at Work: Employment Relations in the Post-Union Era (Washington, DC:
Brookings, 1993); Jane Jenson and Rianne Mahon, eds., Challenge of Restructuring: North
American Labor Movements Respond (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993); and
Charlotte A.B. Yates, From Plant to Politics: The Autoworkers Union in Postwar Canada
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993).
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article will close by comparing the UAW and CAW transplant experiences,
particularly Saturn and CAMI, and by exploring the risks and opportunities
the unions face from the recently signed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
The Restructuring of the U.S. and Canadian Automobile Industries
Until the mid-1960s, the American and Canadian auto industries were
structured into two separate operations by tariff protection legislation, As a
consequence, auto and auto parts production and sales, though dominated by
the Big Three Detroit automakers were largely organized along national
lines with only limited cross border trade in assembled autos. Eventually,
Canada's smaller market for cars and trucks limited its productivity and
caused the Canadian auto industry's competitive position to deteriorate visa-vis the United States. As John Holmes argues, the policy "solution to this
crisis lay in rationalization of assembly and parts production in Canada and
its integration with production in the United States."9 The 1965 Auto Pact
(U.S.-Canada Automotive Products Trade Agreement) integrated Canadian
auto and auto parts production into a continental market and dramatically
increased "productivity in the Canadian assembly and parts industries by
creating a larger market for automotive products within which the full
benefits of specialization and large scale production could be achieved.'' 10
The United States and Canadian auto industries and their workers are
now beset by a shared crisis-a crisis of Fordism, one affecting the entire
system of Fordist production and its underlying regime of capital accumulation.11 The principal causes of this crisis are the internationalization of
auto production and introduction of new process technologies by Japan and
newly industrializing countries like South Korea. The Fordist model has
9. John Holmes, "Industrial Restructuring in a Period of Crisis: An Analysis of the
Canadian Automobile Industry, 1973-1983," Antipode, 20 (1988), 35.
10. Ibid.
11. The crisis of Fordism is rooted in Fordist mass production techniques and its accompanying mass consumption forms, which include economies of scale based on a Taylorist
division of mass assembly line production into ever more specific and defined tasks; a standardized production system with a division of labor ·'which was inflexible, hierarchical, and
characterized by increasing automation, routinization, and mechanization or production tasks"
(John Holmes, "Industrial Restructuring in a Period of Crisis: An Analysis of the Canadian
Automobile Industry, 1973-1983," Antipode, 20 (1988), 39); and a labor-management system
typified by hundreds of job categories, seniority rights, and contracts with wage rate increases
automatically tied to productivity increases and by an absolute bifurcation of labor issues (e.g.,
hourly wages and job duties) and managerial prerogatives (e.g., quality standards, product
design, and line speed).
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been challenged by lean production or Japanese Production Management
(JPM), a flexible production system characterized by integrated superior
quality control, a "leaner" more stringent supply and assembly process, and
a labor management relations system based on "work teams" that require the
use of the team concept to provide multiskilled training, job rotation, and
continuous worker performance. Now the major issue is whether lean
production will overcome the Fordist model and replace it as the ruling
mode of production and consumption.
The painful process of industrial restructuring in the United States and
Canada has underlined the unique benefits and common problems of their
auto industries. The globalization of the auto industry and the sourcing of
auto parts and subassemblies around the world has led U.S. auto assembly
operations and parts suppliers increasingly to move to Mexico. Auto parts
with a high energy content have been sourced to Canada. An historically
favorable exchange rate and a national health insurance program have also
given Canada a labor cost advantage of their U.S. counterparts, perhaps
assuring Canada of holding its share of the more labor-intensive aspects of
the auto industry. 12
At the same time, Japanese lean production methods and other "postFordist" techniques pose a formidable challenge to the continental auto
industry and its workers. The existence of enormous overcapacity jeopardizes the long-term survival of the Big Three automakers in the United
States and their branch plants in Canada. Compounding this threat is the
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1987. As the long-term power in
bilateral trade, the United States looked with great relish at the prospects of
lowering or eliminating trade barriers to Canada. The Mulroney government,
for its part, touted the agreement as a method for overcoming Canada's
branch plant economy and enabling it to become a player in the global
marketplace. Since 1987, however, the agreement has become a major factor
in undercutting the long-standing advantages of the Canadian auto industry.
Ontario's loss of several hundred thousand manufacturing jobs and the mass
exodus of auto parts suppliers to the United States have rocked the native
auto industry and its unionized auto workers. 13
The prospect of a U.S.-Canadian trade agreement, coupled with the
Reagan administration's calls for formal trade restrictions and domestic
content requirements on Japanese autos and the Canadian government's
12. Ibid., 42, 43.
13. Clyde Farmsworth, "Free-Trade Accord is Enticing Canadian Companies to U.S.,"
New York Times, August 9, 1991, A-1.
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TABLE 1
Saturn, Asian Automobile Transplants, and their Joint Ventures with
Big Three Automobile Companies in the United States and Canada
Location

Startup
Date

1992
Production

AutoAiliance
(Ford-Mazda)

Flat Rock, MI

11/84

167,940

3,500

UAW
Local 3000

CAM!
(GM-Suzuki)

Ingersoll, ONT

11!89

143,526

2,000

CAW
Local 88

Diamond-Star
(Mitsubishi)

BloomingtonNormal, IL

9/88

139,705

3,000

UAW
Local 2488

Honda

Marysville, &
E. Liberty, OH

11/82

458,254

9,700

Non-union

Alliston, ONT

10/86

104,270

800

Non-union

Hyundai

Bromont, QUE

1/89

13,548

1,200

Non-union

Nissan

Smyrna, TN

6/83

300,086

5,700

Non-union

NUMMI
(GM-Toyota)

Fremont, CA

11!84

255,729

3,000

UAW
Local 2244

Saturn
(GM)

Spring Hill, TN

7/90

212,112

6,000

UAW
Local 1854

Subaru-Isuzu

Lafayette, IN

9/89

123,877

1,900

Non-union

Toyota

Cambridge, ONT

12/88

68,092

1,000

Non-union

Georgetown, KY

5/88

240,382

3,450

Non-union

Plant

Employees

Union
Status

limitation of Japanese autos to eighteen percent of their vehicle market,
undercut prior economic reluctance of Japanese and South Korean auto
corporations to locate assembly plants in the United States and Canada.
Between 1984 and 1986, Nissan, Honda, Toyota, Suzuki, Mitsubishi,
Mazda, Subaru and Isuzu, and Hyundai in rapid succession announced corporate decisions to build auto transplants or joint ventures in the American
Midwest, Ontario, and Quebec.
The UAW, CAW, and Industrial Restructuring
American labor unions are relatively weak and play an increasingly
marginal role on the United States political scene and economy. By comparison, Canadian organized labor enjoys relative strength and greater political
resources in Canadian politics and political economy. Canadian scholars
have explained Canadian labor's political and economic advantage in terms
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of the more favorable federal and provincial laws supporting union certification, the more militant strategies of organizing and politicking by leading
sectors of the labor movement, the success of Quebec's "Quiet Revolution"
in spurring unionization in the public sector, the existence of a social
democratic party allied to Canadian labor, and perhaps the conservative
statist cultural heritage of the Canadian state. 14 Other students of the Canadian movement have pointed to the growing provincial and federal clout
of Canadian labor's political vehicle, the New Democratic party, and the
militant response by many elements of the labor movement which have
helped to stem the New Right tide in Canadian politics and recoup labor's
position and status on the Canadian political landscape. 15
Within the North American auto sector, the more traditional labormanagement model continues to be practiced within Canadian plants while
much of American organized labor has moved from the more adversarial
model towards a more "cooperative" labor-management approach. 16 These
different models have played themselves out in the different paths taken by
the United Auto Workers and the Canadian Auto Workers in the era of
capitalist industrial restructuring from the Arab oil embargo onward. With
the risk of double-digit unemployment and inflation, the inroads of Japanese
and then South Korean auto firms into the North American and global auto
marketplace, the accompanying challenge of "post-Fordist" management
and labor relations to Fordist organization, and the ascendancy of a New
Right agenda in the United States and, somewhat less so, in Canada, organized labor in the North American auto industry has faced a series of
overlapping and mutually supporting challenges to its traditional role and
place.

14. Christopher Huxley, David Kettler, and James Struthers, "Is Canada's Experience
'Especially Instructive'?" Unions in Transition: Entering the Second Century, ed. by Seymour
Martin Lipset (San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1986) 113-132; John
Calvert, "The Divergent Paths of Canadian and American Labor," Reshaping the US Left:
Popular Struggles in the 1980s, ed. by Mike Davis and Michael Sprinker (New York: Verso,
1988), 213-228; and Roy J. Adams, "North American Industrial Relations: Divergent Trends
in Canada and the United States,'' International Labor Review, 128 (January-February 1989),
47-54.
15. Leo Pan itch and Donald Swartz. The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: From Consent
to Coercion Revisited (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988); Daniel Drache and Harry Glasbeek,
"The New Ford ism in Canada: Capital's Offensive, Labour's Opportunity,'' Osgoode Hall Law
Journal, 27 (Fall 1989), 517-560; and Robert Storey, "Studying Work in Canada,'' Canadian
Journal of Sociology, 16 (1991), 241-264.
16. Stephen Wood, "The Cooperative Labour Strategy in the US Auto Industry, Economic
and Industrial Democracy, 7 (1986), 415-447.
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As Sam Gindin 17 and Charlotte Yates 18 have argued, the greater success of the Canadian wing of the international auto union in responding to
political and corporate incursions on its power and influence hinged, in part
"on [the] union's past choices and practices, its analysis of society and
organized labor's place within it, and those organizational structures which
facilitate or impede a union's ability to effectively mobilize its membership."19 The UAW leadership responded to corporate demands for concessions and union-busting campaigns in ways that meant de facto acceptance
of a strategic reformulation of the collective bargaining process and the
union's power and place within it. 20 The Canadian UAW, on the other hand,
fought these threatening developments in order to preserve the traditional
framework of collective bargaining and maintain the vitality of the trade
union movement. 21
By adopting a no-concessions strategy; institutionalizing a "culture of
struggle" through films, music, art, and other political educational materials;
fostering internal democracy within the union wing; and establishing a wellstaffed research department to investigate the union's condition and to chart
of new directions and policy alternatives, the Canadian wing has vaulted into
the vanguard position in the Canadian labor movement and found itself on
a collision course with its American parent.
By 1985, the divisions within the leadership ranks of the international
auto union became unbridgeable, forcing the Canadian wing to break away
and set an independent course. 22 Thereafter, the UAW confronted deep
challenges to its already declining fortunes from the six Japanese transplants
in the mid-American heartland while in Canada; likewise the entrance of
East Asian auto facilities provided the most formidable challenge to the
Canadian Auto Workers since its split with the international. One challenge
to union power came from the transplants that had a Big Three joint venturer
17. Sam Gindin, "Breaking Away: The Formation of the Canadian Auto Workers,''
Studies in Political Economy, 29 (Summer 1989), 63-89.
18. Charlotte Yates, From Plant to Politics: The Canadian UAW, I936-I984, Ph.D.
Dissertation (Ottawa, Ont.: Carleton University, 1988); and Charlotte Yates, "The Internal
Dynamics of Union Power: Explaining Canadian Autoworkers' Militancy in the 1980s,'' Studies
in Political Economy, 31 (Spring 1990), 73-105.
19. Gindin. op.cit.,75.
20. Wood, op.cit.
21. Gindin, op.cit. 79-83; and Yates (1990), op.cit., 96-100.
22. Jacqueline Scherer, "The Canadian-American UAW Controversy: Issues and Lessons,'' a paper prepared for the Midwest Association of Canadian Studies, 1988; Gindin,
op.cit.; and John Holmes and A. Rusonik, The Breakup of an International Union: Uneven
Development in the North American Auto Industry and the Schism in the UA W [Working paper
90-1) (Kingston, Ont.: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1990).
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(Mazda, NUMMI, and CAMI) and from Saturn with whom the UAW and
CAW had negotiated prehire agreements. 23 The third and fourth sections
will explore the diverging paths taken by the UA W at Saturn and the CAW
at CAMI. Another challenge, the focus of the fourth section, came from the
six nonunion Japanese and Korean automobile companies whose transplants
located in greenfield sites spanning the industrial corridor from Smyrna,
Tennessee to Bromont, Quebec. 24
The United Auto Workers and Saturn
The Saturn Project began in the early eighties at the initiative of Roger
Smith, General Motors' chairman, as an experiment to compete head-tohead with the Japanese automakers in the subcompact car market, a market
GM had hitherto ceded its domestic and foreign competitors. 25 Backed by
the commitment and clout of GM's chairman, Saturn 26 was designed by the
Committee of 99 drawn from management and organized labor to leapfrog
the competition and build subcompact cars in a revolutionary way using a

23. The six Japanese and Korean automobile assembly plants are located near small
towns in rural or greenfield settings; Diamond-Star (Mitsubishi) in Bloomington-Normal, Illinois; Honda in Marysville, Anna, and East Liberty, Ohio and Alliston, Ontario; Hyundai in
Bromont, Quebec; Nissan in Smyrna, Tennessee; Subaru-lsuzu in Lafayette, Indiana; and
Toyota in Georgetown, Kentucky, and Cambridge, Ontario.
Diamond-Star, initially a 50/50 Chrysler-Mitsubishi joint venture, became a wholly owned
Japanese transplant in October 1991 when Mitsubishi purchased Chrysler's 50 percent stake.
Clay Chandler and Bradley A. Stertz, "Mitsubishi Buys Chrysler's 50% Stake in their DiamondStar Joint Venture,'' Wall Street Journal (October 30, 1991), A-4.
Saturn is located in Spring Hill, Tennessee, a greenfield site, as is one of the three BigThree-Japanese joint ventures, CAM! (GM-Suzuki) in Ingersoll, Ontario, but the other two,
NUMMI (GM-Toyota) and Auto-Alliance (Ford-Mazda) are in the brownfield sites of Fremont,
California and Flat Rock, Michigan.
24. Mazda was initially described as a Japanese transplant, not as a joint venture.
Nevertheless, it appears to have been a Ford-Mazda joint venture from the start. Ford owned
25 percent of Mazda, Mazda purchased its Flat Rock plant from Ford, which makes Ford
Probes, and unlike any other transplant, Mazda negotiated a prehire agreement with the UAW.
Mike Parker, "New Union Concessions in Secret Agreement Between UAW and Mazda,'' 84
Labor Notes (February 1986), 1; and Joseph J. Fucini and Suzy Fucini, Working for the
Japanese: Inside Mazda's American Auto Plant (New York: Free Press, 1990), 8-9. In June
1992, Flat Rock assembly plant became a 50!50 Ford/Mazda joint venture, which is named
Autoalliance International.
25. Maryann Keller, Rude Awakening: The Rise, Fall, and Struggle for Recovery of
General Motors (New York: Harper-Collins, 1989), 93-96.
26. Saturn was named and modeled after America's rocket used in the Apollo mission
to overcome the Soviet Union's early lead in space exploration and to send Americans to the
moon.
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whole new production system and a unique labor-management contract.27
Although Roger Smith's dream of a highly automated "paperless"
factory of the future ran aground of technological and organizational realities, many others were realized when GM formally announced its decision
in early January 1985 to form the Saturn Corporation, as a wholly owned
GM subsidiary, and to solicit bids from sites and localities for the Saturn
production facility. 28 In the industrial recruitment contest that followed, 38
states offered a variety of incentive packages to attract the GM investment.
In July 1985, GM ended this six-month contest with an announcement that
it had accepted Tennessee's $80 million offer and would build the Saturn at
Spring Hill, a greenfield site about 30 miles south of Nashville.29
General Motors agreed from the outset to negotiate a union contract
with the United Auto Workers union despite Saturn's location in a right-towork state. To the consternation of state and particularly local Tennessee
officials who saw the state's incentives as a means of relieving area unemployment, the GM-UAW agreement included a provision stating that the
Saturn workforce would be recruited entirely from UA W members on indefinite layoff or from UAW volunteers at GM's other U.S. plants. 30
The GM-UAW Saturn contract was a radical departure from the traditional union-management agreements and met with heated debate and stiff
opposition despite the fact that the UAW executive board ratified it by a 23to-1 vote on July 26, 1985, and included an attachment to the contract
characterizing the Saturn accord as a "special case" and not as a precedent
for other plants. 31 Yet few could doubt that it established an alternative
27. Ellen Jordan, "Saturn Unfolds: The Dream Becomes a Reality,'' Nashville-At-Home,
October 1988, 13-14; and Lee Alpert, Call Me Roger (New York; Contemporary Books, 1988),
239-48.
28. H. Brint Milward and Heidi Hosbach Newman, "State Inventive Packages and the
Industrial Location Decisions," in Ernest J. Yanarella and William C. Green, eds., The Politics
of Industrial Recruitment: Japanese Automobile Investment and Economic Development in the
American States (Westport, Cf: Greenwood Press, 1990), 41-43; and William F. Fox and
Warren G. Nee!, "Saturn: The Tennessee Lessons," Forum for Applied Research and Public
Policy, Spring 1987; 7-16. On the shattering of the myth surrounding Saturn, see Keller,
op.cit., 219-220.
29. For the announcement, see Randy Hilman and James Pratt, "Spring Hill Gets Saturn," The Tennessean, July 26, 1985, 1,8. Tennessee's $80 million incentive package included
$50 million in road improvements and $30 million for worker training. For the terms of the
incentive package, see the table in Milward and Newman, op.cit., 35.
30. Ann J. Job. "Contract OK Won't Mean End to UAW Debate," Detroit Free Press,
July 28, 1985, 13A; and Tim Kiska, "Tennessee May Not Get Jobs Boom," Detroit Free Press,
July 28, 1985, 12A; and "Tennessee Threatens to Block SATURN Plant," Detroit Free Press,
September 1, 1985, 7A.
31. John Russo, "Saturn Rings: What GM's Saturn Project is Really About." Labor
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model for union management relations in the auto industry.
A key Saturn contract provision contained a commitment to jointness
or worker-management cooperation at every level of the plant's operation.
The Saturn contract has been exceptional in its elimination of Paragraph 8's
management rights clause, a cornerstone of GM-UAW contracts since the
thirties, and its substitution by vaguely worded Sections 10 and ll's provisions on structure, decision making, and consensus, which call for "full
participation by the Union" and "use of a consensus decision-making process" involving "free flow of information and clear definition of the decision-making process."32 This extension of formal worker participation in
management, planning, and operation involved the institution of jointly
represented committees grounded in consensus decision making and problem solving from the shop floor to the strategic planning council. In addition, the contract reduced the number of job classifications from over one
hundred to one for all unskilled workers and three to five for skilled
workers. 33 Other features of Japanese production management were also
incorporated into the contract or structured into plant operations and workermanagement relations. These included use of the team concept, extensive
training for all workers, protection against layoffs except for catastrophic
events or severe economic conditions, and reduction or elimination of status
differences between labor and management. The last noteworthy provision
established a pay formula that would eventually put up to 20 percent of
union workers annual pay "at risk" on the basis of meeting performance,
quality, training, and profits objectives or expectations. 34
Saturn stands out as a "pure post-Fordist" model for a unionized auto
plant and as a challenge to an international auto union to fashion a strategy
for turning the rhetoric of workplace democracy into reality. Yet the UAW's
involvement in the Saturn project exists against the backdrop of a union that
has suffered a veritable hemorrhage in membership35 and has straddled the
Research Review, vol. V (Fall 1986), 67-77; Ann M. Job, "Pete Kelly: A Critic Within the
Family,'' Detroit Free Press, July 11, 1985, lOB; Ann M. Job, "SATURN May Change Labor
Relations,'' Detroit Free Press, July 11, 1985, IF; and Helen Fogel, "For Union It May Be a
Mixed Blessing 'Doing Things Differently' Could Mean Fewer Auto Plant Jobs," Detroit Free
Press, July 28, 1985, 14A.
32. "Saturn Labor Agreement Approved by UAW in July 1985 [Text]." Washington,
DC: Bureau of National Affairs, June 4, 1986, E-1 to E-6.
33. Ann M. Job, "UAW Pact Blurs Worker, Manager Distinctions,'' Detroit Free Press,
July 28, 1985, 14A.
34. Ibid.
35. UAW membership plummeted from 1.53 million in 1973 to 862,000 in 1991. The
UA W dropped from representing 86 percent of the American auto workers in 1979 to less than
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issue of worker participation versus worker power and sent mixed cues to
union locals about "post-Fordist" or lean production-type practices. These
circumstances have triggered a diverse set of responses from plant to plant
ranging from outright resistance to virtual total accommodation.36 Since the
plant's startup in July 1990, the Saturn experiment in labor-management
cooperation or jointness has set in motion some ominous trends that threaten
to undercut the strength and solidarity within the UAW and erode its
commitment to local union democracy.
The Saturn contract's elimination of the management rights clause and
its commitment to jointness have meant that in the everyday operation of the
Saturn complex, the terms and locus of corporate power have shifted from
the conventional hierarchical arrangements epitomized in the managerial
rights provision at the strategic level to the more formally participative and
pseudo-egalitarian relations underpinned by a veiled use of corporate power
worked out within joint committees and in training sessions.
To illustrate, Saturn's operations involve a multiplicity of joint committees from top to bottom that involve representatives of rank-and-file
union workers and management in consensus decision making on long-term
strategic and more immediate day-to-day issues. Some proponents of the
Saturn experiment, like Irving and Barry Bluestone, applaud it as an approximation of an innovative Enterprise Compact of the future, 37 but the
daily jointness of the Saturn worker cooperation process has more fundamentally served to socialize union representatives and the workforce into the
Saturn corporate ideology, values, and priorities set forth in the mission
statement. Visitors to Saturn provide evidence of the blurring of labor and
management's sepa~ate identities and conflicting interests with their oftcited observation that it is impossible to distinguish the formal presentations
of salaried (management) employees from those of the nonsalaried (labor)
employees at the plant or the training center. 38 Saturn is also vulnerable to
Robbins's and March's critique of Theory Z organizations analyzed and
touted by William Ouchi, since the Spring Hill assembly plant tends to
obscure in its daily operation the critical difference between worker power
68 percent in 1991. Cited in Jane Slaughter, "Shrinking Auto Union Beats Back Reformers,''
Autoworker Gazette: Newsletter of the Rank and File Coalition, July/July 1992, 3.
36. Turner, op.cit., see intro., chap. 1, and conclusion.
37. Barry Bluestone and Irving Bluestone, Negotiating the Future, A Labor Perspective
on American Business (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1992), 191-201.
38. Most recently mentioned by Gary High, Manager, Human Resource Development,
People Systems, Saturn Corporation, interview, Training Center, Saturn plant, Spring Hill,
Tennessee, March 16, 1993.
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and worker participation and to enhance managerial control "while giving
the impression of lessening it."39
Worker training assumes a critical role when formal managerial rights
are scrapped for the appearance of greater democracy and equal labormanagement influence. On the positive side, the Saturn training program is
one of the most extensive and innovative among American and Japanese
auto assembly plants in the United States. 40 Production workers are expected
to make a commitment to receive at least 92 hours of formal training annually as part of the risk and reward compensation system of the company.
Down from 300 and then 175 hours during 1988-1991, the 92 hours,
roughly 5 percent of total annual work hours, represents the "at risk" portion
of workers' wages. 41 Yet, as critics of corporate training programs like
Saturn's point out, upwards of 70 percent of such training programs at GM
facilities fall in the category of cultural or attitudinal training, i.e., indoctrination into the reigning corporate ideology. Much of the rest that falls into
the category of technical training is not transferable to other plants and,
therefore, reduces the worker's potential mobility. 42
The increasing solidification of the union-management partnership at
the elite level has been accompanied by the ebbing of democratic processes
within the local union. Personal interviews and published reports have
disclosed that local 1854 has no union hall outside the plant; its meetings are
freely attended by corporate and human resources officials; 43 and its local
president, Mike Bennett, has buffered himself from the rank and file by two
39. The quotation is from Stephen P. Robbins, "The Theory Z Organization from a
Power-Control Perspective,'' California Management Review, vol. XXV (January 1993), 75;
and Robert M. Marsh, "The Difference Between Participation and Power in Japanese Factories,'' Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 45 (January 1992), 250-257. Ouchi's book
is titled, Theory Z: How American Business Can Meet the Japanese Challenge (New York:
Avon Books, 1981).
40. High, interview, March 16, 1993; and Geber, op.cit., 29.
41. Cited from a GM memorandum in David Robertson and Jeff Wareham, Technological
Change in the Auto Industry (North York, Canada: CAW Technology Project, 1987), 47;
David Robertson, "Corporate Training Syndrome: What We Have is Not Enough and More
Would Be Too Much," and "The Meaning of Multi-skilling,'' in Training for What? Labor
Perspectives on Skill Training, ed. by Nancy Jackson (Toronto: Our Schools/Our Selves
Foundation (November 1992), 18-28 and 29-42 respectively.
42. In addition to our site visit, guided tour, and interview with Gary High at the Saturn
Training Center, our analysis of corporate training at Saturn also draws upon selected materials
provided by the human resources manager and two articles: Brian S. Moskal, "Hybrid Incubator
Hatches Workers,'' Industry Week, August 7, 1989, 27-28; and Beverly Geber, "Saturn Grand
Experiment,'' Training, vol. 29 (June 1992), 27-35.
43. Don Hinkle, business writer, Columbia Daily Herald, interview, Columbia, Tennessee, March 15, 1993; and High, interview, op.cit.
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layers of 350-400 appointed union officials who hold positions as work unit
module advisors and business unit coordinators. 44 More alarming is the key
role played by the local union leadership and its president in manufacturing
consent and enforcing corporate policies cloaked as common interests of the
rank-and-file membership. The stirrings of grass roots insurgency during the
brief life of the union contract and the plant's operation were capped in
March and April 1993 by a serious challenge and near run-off defeat of
Bennett triggered by the deterioration of local union democracy and the
progressive breakdown of local union leadership solidarity with other UAW
local unions and the internal transformation of the local union into an agent
of corporate power.
During the March 1993 campaign, Bennett was criticized by his opponents for his authoritarian, heavy-handed rule over the local, his disregard
for national solidarity, and his apparently active pursuit of a strategy of local
autonomy. 45 Indicative of this tendency toward giving priority to local
concerns was Bennett's criticism of UAW local 1714's nine-day strike in
September 1992 against the GM Lordstown stamping plant over outsourcing
policy. When the strike idled Saturn production for a week, Bennett unsuccessfully appealed to UA W international officials to exempt some of the
Lordstown workers from the strike in order to let them cross the picket lines
to produce parts for Saturn. 46 Bennett's appeal clearly demonstrated his
greater interest in maintaining Saturn production over saving jobs of fellow
and sister members at the Lordstown plant.
The Saturn experiment thus raises a number of questions about the
prospects and implications of the UAW's unique partnership with the Saturn
corporation for the UAW's status, strategy, and future strength. Saturn also
presents a host of issues for labor and management. For local 1854, Saturn
raises the issue of the local's unfolding identity. Is it becoming a truly equal
partner in a model Enterprise Compact or is it slipping into the mold of a
company union by another name? As for the Saturn operation itself, the
Saturn experiment asks whether this apparent corporate success story offers
generalizable lessons for other assembly plants in GM or whether its
achievements to date are unique, idiosyncratic, and subject to changing
whims of quixotic customers and shifting fortunes of a glutted North Ameri44. Don Hinkle, "Saturn Election May Impact Economic Growth in County," Columbia
Daily Herald, March 10, 1993, 1,3.
45. Don Hinkle, "Challenger Blasts Saturn's Union Head [interview with Bob Hoskins,
nominee of Members for a Democratic Union], Columbia Daily Herald, March 9, 1993, 1,3.
46. Jane Slaughter, "Auto Union Wins Outsourcing Protection After Nine-Day Lordstown
Strike,'' Labor Notes, October 1993, 5.
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can auto marketplace. For the United Auto Workers, Saturn raises the issue
of whether and how the union can recover its past power and glory and forge
a new identity.

The Canadian Auto Workers and CAMI
On August 27, 1986, General Motors, Canada's largest automaker, and
Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd., one of Japan's smallest, announced their decision to
locate a $500 million auto assembly plant in Ingersoll, Ontario, on August
27, 1986. Christened CAMI47 by GM-Suzuki officers, the plant itself was
expected to employ 2,000 workers and produce annually some 200,000
automobiles and sport utility vehicles (SUVs) when up to full production,
scheduled for 1991.
Neither the size of the incentive package nor the mix of inducements
comprising it stirred much commentary. What was most noteworthy about
this announcement was that, in addition to the usual cast of characters (i.e.,
Ontario Premier David Peterson, DRIE Minister Michael Cote, Ontario Ministry of Industry Trade and Technology Pat Levelle, Suzuki President Osamu
Suzuki and GM Chairman Roger Smith) Canadian Auto Workers' (CAW)
President Bob White was in attendance and a signatory to the agreement.48
His presence symbolized the decision of the president of Suzuki Motor Co.
to avoid a battle over unionization of the plant and to accept from the outset
the organization of its workers by Canada's militant auto workers union. 49
The GM-Suzuki/CAW agreement, which took over two years to negotiate, materialized out of discussions initiated by President Suzuki with
CAW leader Bob White in Japan in mid-1985, continued by means of informal bargaining among the Japanese automaker and Canadian partner and the
union, and concluded with an understanding in the summer of 1986. A
formal three-year contract between the two sides was reached in mid-January 1989 and was ratified by over 80 percent of CAW local 88's membership on January 21, 1989. 50 This flexible labor agreement was a clear departure from traditional auto union contracts and represented a necessary
47. CAMI is an acronym for Canadian-American Manufacturing, Inc. and the symbol for
a divinity in Shintoism.
48. James Daw, "GM, Suzuki to Build Car Plant in Ingersoll," Toronto Star, August 27,
1986, El.
49. James Daw, "Japanese-style Hiring Hall Knocks Auto Workers' Boots Off," Toronto
Star, July 24, 1988, Fl.
50. Interview with Ron Pellerin, Director of Service, Canadian Auto Workers, Willowdale,
Ontario, August 1, 1991.
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concession by the CAW to gain access to an auto plant organized around
Japanese lean production methods.5 1
The CAMI plant's management is divided between GM managers who
handle human resource and financing functions and Suzuki management
personnel who are responsible for plant design, car models, much of the
machinery, and for running the manufacturing and engineering operations
and sourcing activity. 52 With its modified Japanese-style management,
CAMI has become an experimental laboratory for training GM executives in
the so-called lean production facilities in other parts of Canada and the
United States. 53 For the Canadian Auto Workers, it has also been an important testing ground for blending traditional union interests and goals with a
management philosophy and production line guided by new assumptions,
tasks, techniques, controls, and social relations. 54
In so doing, the CAMI plant and its "post-Fordist" methods have
created a series of problems and dilemmas, which the auto union and its
leadership have yet to overcome.
This new flexible production facility has instituted new organizational
and production methods, including the team concept, quality circles,
multiskilling, and a truncated pseudo-egalitarian job classification structure,
that are antithetical to traditional labor-management relations and the structure and roles of unions. The CAW response to these changes, at least on the
surface, has appeared ambivalent and contradictory. The CAW has rhetorically upheld the virtues of traditional collective bargaining methods and
adversarial trade unionism in the face of the "post-Fordist" threat from East
Asia. For instance, in its "CAW Statement on the Reorganization of
Work," 55 the leadership of the Canadian auto workers set forth a strong and
sweeping eleven-point indictment of workplace restructuring along Japanese
Production Management (JPM) lines and rejected virtually all of the major

51. Interview with James Rinehart, professor of sociology, University of Western Ontario,
London, Ontario, July 27, 1991; and David Robertson, James Rinehart, Christopher Huxley,
and the CAW Research Group on CAMI, "Team Concept and Kaizen: Japanese Production
Management in a Unionized Auto Plant," Studies in Political Economy, vol. 39 (Autumn 1992),
77-107.
52. Lindsay Chappell, "GM Flocks North to Learn from Lean, Mean CAMI," Automotive
News, 66 (May 20, 1991b), 1,44; and interview with Tom Grygorcewicz, plant chair, CAW
local 88, CAMI plant, Ingersoll, Ontario, July 30, 1991.
53. Chappell, op.cit.
54. Robertson, Rinehart, and Huxley, op.cit.; and Jeff Blount, "Behind the Lines,"
Canadian Business, January, 1990, 62-67.
55. Canadian Auto Workers, "Statement on the Reorganization of Work," Willowdale,
Ont.: CAW National Headquarters, 1989.
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features of Japanese-inspired flexible production. At the same time, the
CAW policy statement champions true workplace democracy and supports
quality production and technological innovation that do not weaken worker
rights, erode workplace conditions, and undercut union independence. On
the other hand, the Canadian auto union made a "tactical compromise,"56
and entered into negotiations with Suzuki, and then GM and Suzuki, that
resulted in a union contract at the CAMI plant. In exchange for recognition
as the sole bargaining agent for CAMI's production and maintenance employees, the union formally endorsed with only slight modification a flexible
production agreement that included the team concept, the kaizen (or continuous improvement) process, a highly truncated job classification scheme,
and quality circles.5 7
Since signing the CAMI contract, the union has striven to confront the
dilemmas of working in a plant governed by principles and practices inimical to traditional union authority and rights. Indeed, even before gaining
union representation at CAMI, the education and research departments in the
CAW national office began to work out the problems and dilemmas posed
by JPM techniques. 58 As CAMI's local88 and the CAW national headquarters have come to grips with the day-to-day functioning of the CAMI plant,
the value of the "tactical compromise" has become more apparent. The
CAW is confronting a new and evolving set of production methods and
industrial relations that, in helping to foment the crisis of Fordism, is severely testing the capacity of unions to adapt to, and to struggle to modify
and refashion so-called "post-Fordism" in the production process and on the
shopfloor. 59 While there is no certainty that these efforts will succeed, a
survey of CAMI local 88's newsletter and interviews with CAW local and
national representatives 60 confirm that the union is "locked in a struggle for
the hearts and minds of the workforce" and is strategically positioned
"between a collective agreement that accommodates aspects of team concept
and a policy statement of the national union that raises substantial questions
about the implications of JPM." 61 Already, it has become clear that the role
and loyalty of the team leaders are pivotal in shaping the outcome of the
56. Rinehart, op.cit.
57. CAMI-CAW, Agreement between CAM/ Automotive Inc., and CAW Local88, January
23, 1989-September 14, 1992.
58. Robertson, Rinehart, and Huxley, op.cit, 13.
59. Don Wells, Empty Promises: Quality of Work Life Program and the Labor Movement (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987); Drache and Glasbeek, op.cit.; and Robertson,
Rinehart, and Huxley, op.cit.
60. Grygorcewicz, op.cit.; and Pellerin, op.cit.
61. Robertson, Rinehart, and Huxley, op.cit., 14.
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combat. 62 Whether the production teams become integrated into the corporate philosophy of the company or become vehicles for resistance and reconstruction of the labor process depends crucially on the self-identity of those
leaders. Are they appendages of management or representatives of union
labor?
The CAW at various levels has also undertaken several initiatives to
illuminate and support the shopfloor struggle. In the negotiations over the
CAMI contract, the CAW bargained for the right to monitor the plant's
operation. This concession has led to a two-year study by the CAW research
team of the dynamics and impact of flexible production methods upon this
unionized plant. 63 The CAW has also investigated in a series of studies some
of the critical issues relating to the impact of technological innovation in
industries where it has union representation. 64 In addition, the CAW research staff has also turned its attention to an assessment of the union's
stakes in the international debate over worker-training programs and the
incipient policy debate over the same issue among Canadian labor studies
and critical political economists. 65
Local 88's leadership, aware that modified flexible production techniques have been appropriated by the Big Three automakers and instituted
in other North American auto plants, has begun to participate in an informal
network of unions in Canada and the United States designed to exchange
information and lessons from their shared struggle with flexible production
plants. Since January 1991, representatives between CAMI's local 88 and
renegade UAW local 3000 at Mazda's Flat Rock, Michigan, plant have
visited one another and issued reports on the Mazda local's success in
winning concessions from management in its latest contract. These contracts
shaped the demands, the strike, and the final outcome of local 88's contract
negotiations with GM-Suzuki in late September and early October 1992.
Subsequently, these two locals have brought representatives of the UAW
62. Ibid., 30; Grygorcewicz., op.cit.; and Rob Pelletier, "President's Message;· Off the
Line, No. 7 (February 1991), 1.
63. Robertson, Rinehart, and Huxley, op.cit.; and CAW Research Group on CAMI,
Japanese Management in a Unionized Auto Plant: Final Report to Labor Canada (North York:
CAW Research Department, March 1992), inc. "CAMI Comments.''
64. David Robertson and Jeff Wareham, Technological Change in the Auto Industry:
CAW Technology Project, Willowdale, Ontario: CAW!fCA, April 1987.
65. Leon Muszynski and David A. Wolfe, "New Technology and Training: Lessons from
Abroad,'' Canadian Public Policy, 15 (September 1989), 245-264; Rianne Mahon, "Adjusting
to Win? The New Tory Training Initiative,'' How Ottawa Spends 1990-91: Tracking the
Second Agenda, ed. by Katherine A. Graham (Ottawa, Ont.: Carleton University Press, 1991),
73-111; David Robertson, "Corporate Training Syndrome,'' op.cit.; and David Robertson,
"The Meaning of Multi-skilling," op.cit.
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local at the Mitsubishi Diamond-Star plant in Bloomington-Normal, Illinois,
into the evolving constellation.66
The UAW, CAW and The Nonunion East Asian Transplants

The UAW and CAW have faced formidable barriers in organizing the
U.S. and Canadian East Asian transplants, which made location and recruitment decisions and used lean production practices, in part, to limit labor
organizing. All the transplants, located in greenfield sites, recruited from an
essentially small town, nonunion labor force with limited manufacturing
experience; employed a recruitment process to screen out applicants with
prounion sympathies and screen in team players; and used the team concept
not merely to organize and set the pace for work, but also to shape the
workers shopfloor culture and, thereby, to frustrate worker efforts to organize.67
The UAW efforts to organize the transplants suffered an early setback.
In 1985, the union discontinued its Honda organizing drive for lack of
worker support. The scheduled election was not held and for now, the UAW
appears to have written off any active interest in returning to Marysville. 68
Of the other three nonunion transplants, the UAW's most serious organizing effort began at Nissan in early 1988. In the often bitter twentymonth campaign that followed, the union focused on the high incidence of
worker injuries, such as carpal tunnel syndrome, and company efforts to
increase workloads through front-office kaizen. 69 The UAW organizing
campaign was, however, disadvantaged from the outset by Nissan's
greenfield location in a right-to-work state, its recruitment and training
practices, its high wages, and its no layoff practices. The UAW also encountered a vigorous antiunion campaign by the automaker.7° As Jane Slaughter
observed: "Nissan used its plant-wide video system and daily work group
66. David C. Binns, ed. and comp., A Shared Struggle: A Local 88 Communications
Committee Special Report on the Meetings with UA W Local 3000 Mazda Unit in Flat Rock,
Michigan. mimeo, 1991; John L. Fulton Special Report: A Communications Committee Follow-up Report on UA W-Mazda Agreement 1991-1994, mimeo, 1991; and Grygorcewicz, op.cit.
67. See., e.g. Shimada and McDuffie (1987), op.cit., 55-56; Kenney and Florida (1993),
op.cit., 101-105; and Laurie Graham, "Inside a Japanese Transplant: A Critical Perspective,"
Work and Occupations, vol. 20 (May 1993), 147-73.
68. "Workers at Nissan Turn Down U.S. Union." Toronto Star, July 28, 1989, A-4.
69. Phil West, "Will Nissan Unionize?" Lexington Herald-Leader, July 23, 1989, D-1;
and Jane Slaughter, "Behind the UAW's Defeat at Nissan," Labor Notes, September 1989,
1,12,13.
70. Kenney and Florida (1993), op.cit., 284-85; and Slaughter, op.cit., 13.
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meetings to hammer home its antiunion message .... The day before the
vote, Nissan shut down the line for up to an hour on each shift for captive
audience meetings."71
In July 1989, Nissan workers rejected UAW representation by a vote
of 1622 (69 percent) to 711 (31 percent). Nearly one-third of Nissan workers
had supported the union in spite of the transplant's efforts to recruit a nonunion workforce and to staunchly resist its unionization, but it was still a
defeat that would encourage the other transplants to actively resist unionization. In the wake of its defeat, the UAW bravely vowed to organize Toyota,
but the Georgetown plant remains unorganized. At Subaru-Isuzu (SIA), the
UAW began organizing efforts in 1991, but an election has yet to be held.7 2
In Canada, the Toyota and Honda assembly plants have thus far been
resistant to CAW organizing campaigns. Honda and Toyota have also located in the greenfield sites of Alliston and Cambridge, Ontario, and have
closely screened potential employees for union sympathies.73 The Honda
management has also been accused of finding excuses for firing union supporters in its workforce.74 The CAW has found it difficult to organize the
two transplants, because Canadian plants have tighter security surrounding
the facilities and maintain a lower profile in their communities than do those
in the United States. Canadians also seem to be less hostile and willing to
grant greater latitude to big business in Canada, despite the relative strength
of trade unions and social democratic organization there.7 5 So it is not
surprising that organizers have been hassled by plant security officers and
forced to locate their leafleting completely off plant grounds.76
The CAW chances of winning union certification appears highest at
the Hyundai plant in Bromont. Having worked hard since the seventies to
promote union organizing of plants in Quebec, the union restructured its
organization, following its independence from the UAW, by setting up a

71. Jane Slaughter, "Behind the UAW's Defeat at Nissan,'' Labor Notes, September 1989,
1,12,13.
72. Greg Gardner and Nunzio Lupo, "UAW, Stung by Loss in Tennessee, is Struggling,"
Lexington Herald-Leader, July 30, 1989, D-1; and Lindsay Chappell and Kathy Jackson,
"UAW Again Targets the Transplants," Automotive News, January 14, 1991, 2.
73. James Daw, "Japanese-style Hiring Hall Knocks Auto Workers' Boots Off," Toronto
Star, July 24, 1988, Fl.
74. Interview with Hemi Metic, Director of Organizing, Canadian Auto Workers,
Willowdale, Ontario, August 1, 1991.
75. Seymour Martin Lipset, North American Cultures: Values and Institutions in Canada
and the United States [Borderlands Monograph Series #3] (Orono, Me.: The CanadianAmerican Center, 1990).
76. Metic, op.cit.
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Quebec regional office and director and establishing a Quebec Council with
co-equal status with the Ontario-dominated CAW Council.77 At Hyundai,
the CAW organizing drive has centered on job rotation work rules and the
sliding-scale pension plan introduced by Hyundai management.78 Since
spring of 1991, reports have circulated that the auto union effort was close
to reaching the magic number required for union certification, although one
field organizer reported in early August 1991 that its formal request was
being deferred.79 Apparently, the Hyundai management's release of conflicting information on the exact number of plant employees led union organizers to acquire extra signatures on union cards to be assured of acquiring
certification, 80 an effort complicated by a rumor that Hyundai was considering moving the plant to Mexico. 81
In sum, the seven East Asian assembly plants in the American Midwest, Ontario, and Quebec have successfully resisted union organization
efforts. None of their workers is represented by the UAW or CAW. Given
the United States and Canada's prevailing economic woes and the high wage
scales of these plants, the UAW's and CAW's struggle to unionize these
transplants will face an uphill battle. At the same time, union organizers
believe that the rising rates of job injuries and incidence of carpal tunnel
syndrome and other repetitive stress ailments stemming from assembly line
speedup and the kaizen process will lead to mounting worker restiveness,
particularly with the aging of the presently young workforce.
The UA W and CAW confront other dilemmas emanating from these
East Asian plants. The widespread popularity of these vehicles (with the
possible exception of Hyundai autos), combined with their production levels,
have contributed greatly to the overcapacity problem in the North American
marketplace. This has meant that older, typically unionized, auto plants in
the United States and Canada have been most vulnerable to temporary
layoffs and plant shutdowns. While UAW president Owen Bieber's position
has been highly ambivalent, Bob White, the CAW president, has argued that
77. Canadian Auto Workers, "CAW-Canada Organizing Report," Willowdale, Ont.: CAW
National Headquarters, n.d.
78. Lindsay Chappell, "CAW Tackles Hyundai Canada; Work Rules and Pensions Cited,"
Automotive News, 66 (February 11, 1991), 6.
79. Metic, op.cit.; interview with Francois Shalom, "Battle to Form Union at Hyundai
Heats Up; CAW Say It is Close to Having Enough Support to Hold Vote," Montreal Gazette,
December 12, 1990, C1; and James Daw, "Hyundai Workers Sign Up for Union," Toronto Star,
May 23, 1991, B4.
80. Metic, op.cit.
81. Interview with Damaris Rose, associate professor and research associate, Institute for
National Scientific Research, Montreal, Ontario, August 5, 1991.
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the overcapacity problem is management's problem, not an issue subject to
collective bargaining with the union. 82 Still, with the percentage of unionized plant closings in Canada doubling from 1989 to 199083 and with GM's
announcement in December 1991 to abolish 74,000 jobs and close 21 plants
by 1995,84 harder thinking and more ingenuity in promoting job security
seem to be required.
Conclusion

The crisis of Fordism posed by the Japanese production methods remains unresolved. Contrary to those scholars who have declared that
Fordism has been superseded by "post-Fordism,"85 Rianne Mahon has argued that the possibilities for a diversified Fordist alternative for Canada
spearheaded by organized labor, are outlined in the work of Streeck and
anticipated by developments within the German labor movement. 86 This
strategic option emphasizes the critical role of organized labor, in coalition
with other subordinate groups and movements, to remold tendencies toward
authoritarian forms of "post-Fordism" in a direction that realizes the democratic promise of worker involvement, teamwork, multiskilled training, and
other illusory claims of flexible production on the shopfloor. 87
The diverging paths taken by the UA W at Saturn and the CAW at
CAMI demonstrate the growing gap between the strategies and tactics of
these two auto unions in confronting the crisis of Fordism. Although neither
union represents the central tendencies in the labor movement of each coun-

82. Bob White, "Presentation," The Canadian Auto Industry [The Financial Post Conferences] (Harbour Castle Westin Hotel, Toronto, Ontario, February 12, 1991), 54-63; and
Bob White, "An Inquiry Into the Current Situation of the Canadian Auto Industry,'' presentation to the hearings before the Standing Committee on Industry, Science, Technology, Regional & Western Development, Ottawa, Ontario, July 9, 1991.
83. Jacqueline Scherer, "The Canadian Auto Workers: A Study in Canadian-United States
Relations,'' a paper for the Midwest Association of Canadian Studies Conference, Lexington,
Kentucky, October 11-13, 1990.
84. Warren Brown, "GM to Abolish 74,000 jobs, Shut 21 Plants,'' Lexington HeraldLeader, December 19, 1991, A-1.
85. Kenney and Florida, op.cit.; and Womack, Jones, and Roos, op.cit.
86. Mahon (1987, 1991), op.cit.
87. William K. Carroll, "Restructuring Capital, Reorganizing Consent; Gramsci, Political Economy, and Canada," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, vol. 27 (1990),
390-416; John Harp, "Political Economy/Cultural Studies: Exploring Points of Convergence,"
Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, vol. 28 (1991), 206-224; Wells, op.cit., and
Robertson, Rinehart, and Huxley, op.cit.
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try in trying to come to grips with that crisis, 88 the failure of cooperative
strategies undertaken by many elements of the American labor movement
exemplified by the UA W experience at Saturn to revive the fortunes of
organized labor in the United States should give union leaders and labor
studies scholars pause. By contrast, the continuing political struggle of the
CAW at CAMI and its recently concluded successful strike at the GMSuzuki plant point to the outlines of a more appropriate, but no less militant
strategy for labor in an era between Fordism and "post-Fordism." The CAW
example shows that Fordist adversarial practices are not dead or outmoded,
though perhaps the issues and terms of the political struggle have been
modified.
No doubt, this evolving CAW strategy and any new UAW strategic
vista will have to evaluate the new risks and new opportunities from the
ongoing process of hemispheric and global restructuring in the automobile
industry and the recently concluded negotiations between the United States,
Canada, and Mexico on a North American Free Trade Agreement. Organized labor may also face another and even more formidable challenge and
be further disadvantaged by the Mexican maquiladoras (border plants) and
the increased capacity of mobile capital to further redistribute segments of
auto production in a continental free trade zone. At the same time, NAFTA
will also provide renewed impetus to UAW and CAW efforts to develop
closer ties with Mexican workers and to reassert the priority for a truly
continental labor response. 89
The renewed power of the Democratic party in the United States and
the ascendancy of the New Democratic party in Ontario and Canadian politics raises the question of what productive role they may play in the larger
policy debate over industrial strategy, free trade, and industrial restructuring
in a more tightly integrated global political economy. Fordism's great material benefits to workers and consumers were derived in large part from
organized labor's participation in this regime of accumulation and consumption. If these parties and their leaders are to be worthy of their man-

88. An important and, in some ways, sobering point made by Don Wells, "Recent Innovations in Labour-Management Relations: The Risks and Prospects for Labour in Canada and
the United States," in Jenson and Mahon, op.cit., 290.
89. Matt Witt, "Mexico-US-Canada ITA: Free Workers, Not Free Trade," Canadian
Dimension, April-May 1991, 28-31; Ricardo Grinspun and Maxwell A. Cameron, ed., The
Political Economy of North American Free Trade (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); and
Maureen Appel Molot, ed., Driving Continentally: National Policies and the North American
Auto Industry (Ottawa, Can.: Carleton University Press, 1993).
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dates, they must begin to think through the political stakes and policy terrain
for alternatives to a market-based industrial strategy, which merely promotes
a bimodal economy of good careers and quality products for the well-to-do
and of service and retail jobs for the unorganized and exploited poor. 90

9o. Mahon (1987, 1991), op.cit.; and Mike Davis, "The Political Economy of Late Imperial
America," New Left Review, No. 123 (1984), 6-38.

